




   
Τ Ε Y Χ Ο Σ  3  •  V O L U M E  3   ⌘    Δ Ε Κ Ε Μ Β Ρ Ι Ο Σ  2 0 2 0  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 2 0
ΠΕΡΙΟΔΙΚΟ ΤΟΥ  ΤΟΜΕΑ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ  ΚΑΙ  ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ  ΤΗΣ  ΤΕΧΝΗΣ  
ΤΜΗΜΑ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΣ  ΚΑΙ  ΑΡΧΑΙΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ  ΤΟΥ  ΕΘΝΙΚΟΥ ΚΑΙ  ΚΑΠΟΔΙΣΤΡΙΑΚΟΥ  
ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟΥ ΑΘΗΝΏΝ
R EV IEW OF  THE  DEPARTMENT OF  ARCHAEOLOGY AND HISTORY  OF  ART
FACULTY  OF  HISTORY  AND ARCHAEOLOGY 
NATIONAL  AND KAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY  OF  ATHENS
AURA
Before mimesis 
Reflections on the early Greek technologies of looking
Dimitris Plantzos
Faculty of History and Archaeology,  National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
dkplantzos@arch.uoa.gr 
ABSTRACT
Material agency has been puzzling archaeologists for almost three decades now. The idea that artifacts, 
a priori perceived as passive and inert ‘creations’ subject to human volition, have the capacity to interact 
with their makers, users, or viewers may be seen as a challenge to archaeologists and their inherently 
humanist discipline. Classical archaeology, and the study of Greek and Roman art in particular, seem to 
have been avoiding the issue, choosing instead to privilege artistic agency or – in more recent years – a 
cultural-historical discourse primarily informed through linguistics and sociology. This paper explores 
the concepts of materiality, agency, and personhood as cultural mediators in order to investigate the 
ways Greeks interacted with the images they created. Through a number of case studies borrowed from 
the wider repertoire of early Greek ‘art’ it is argued that artifacts are invariably conceived as animate 
entities, at least in early Greece; moreover, that technologies of representation in early Greek art (what 
art historians understand as ‘styles’) are devised and promoted as cultural agents within Greek society.
ARTIFACTS TO THINGS
Classical scholars tend to describe ancient Greece as a realm of images,1 this metaphor 
however seems to be missing one of Greek culture’s most fundamental qualities: the way 
Greeks understood things, and the extent to which they allowed their lives to be entangled with 
them. As classical archaeologists, or even as mere Graecophiles, we are of course surrounded 
by things – albeit disguised as archaeological artifacts, idolized as museum exhibits, glorified 
as historical treasures, coveted as valuable possessions, studied as exquisite works of a now 
lost art.2 We interact with them in quasi-linguistic terms; assuming, somewhat arbitrarily, that 
ancient artifacts are phonemes communicating to us the particulars of the culture that created 
them.3 Whereas, in fact, we have been studying Greek art through a strictly empiricist canon, 
whereby things – especially things bearing or acting as images – convey ideas, that is words, in 
a straightforwardly, and quite conveniently monosemantic way.
1   Chiefly, among many others, Vernant 1984, emphasizing the need for an iconology of Greek vase painting, 
and investigating latent structures of meaning in the visual arts of (mostly) Archaic Greece. 
2   See, e.g., Schnapp 1993; Shanks 1996, 22–52; Thomas 2004, 1–34; Dyson 2006, 133–71.
3   See, e.g., Mertens 2010; Stansbury-O’ Donnell 2011.
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How does one treat images as things? In recent years, archaeologists have tried to incorporate 
a more anthropological reasoning into their discipline, thus upsetting its traditionally 
anthropocentric bias. (Ironically, classical archaeology’s inherent anthropocentrism has been 
often expressed through the intense de-humanization of the material record, as for example 
with its predisposition for mind-numbing typologies and tedious cataloguing.4) This new turn 
has indeed encouraged a decidedly materialist reading of material culture, one significantly 
departing from the humanist tradition. Greek archaeology, in particular, including its prehistoric 
components such the ‘Mycenaean’, the ‘Minoan’ and the ‘Cycladic’, has spent the last two 
hundred years or so striving to demonstrate how artistic intelligence created singular meanings 
and how these affected modern ideas of humanity – hence the emergence of ‘classical’ art and 
our infatuation with it. This allowed for multiple readings of the past – idealist to materialist – 
though not for the possibility that classical culture was nothing like what modernity had ever 
made of it. Treating artifacts – that is objects imbued with meanings supposedly created by 
the humans that made them – as things, with the capacity to transform human experience 
by determining our behavior and identity through the properties inherent in them from their 
own make, reverses the hitherto accepted cultural flow from maker to viewer; this enables the 
epistemological shift from innate, stable, and ‘dead’ objects available to our ostensibly scientific 
scrutiny to enmeshed, engaged, and entangled things which create ‘continual flows of matter, 
energy and information’.5 Whenever this line of reasoning has been used in the study of Greek 
art (mostly of the early periods)6 it has produced encouraging results. The inherent asymmetries 
within classical archaeology’s disciplinary apparatus seemed thus to be rectified somewhat, 
to the frustration of some of its most conventional exponents.7 Adopting an ‘impartial’, and 
categorically non-humanist approach to scientific methodology, symmetrical archaeology was 
expected to encourage cross-disciplinarity while at the same time questioning the coherence 
of the conventional archaeological paradigm.8 Although this ‘turn’ was not welcomed by all 
(and one may even question the extent to which it has been achieved in the first place),9 it 
has become clear that material agencies operated in ancient – and indeed any premodern – 
societies in ways often imperceptible by modern epistemic discourse.
How did pre-modern images look like? A quick comparison of two literary texts may serve as 
an introduction to our discussion. Take, first, the parodic chant from Euripides’ Ion, (c. 419–418 
BC), where the chorus of Athenian maidens escorting the queen of Athens to the sanctuary 
of Delphi takes hold of the captivating spectacle (vv 184–215).10 A striking variety of verbs 
and verbal units signifying seeing and looking are deployed in order to suggest the divine 
epiphanies surrounding the mesmerized travelers:
4   Cf. Shanks 1996, 25–6; on the question whether archaeological interpretation may by ultimately disassociated 
from human (that is "scholarly") inference, see Garcia-Rovira 2015.
5   Hodder 2012, 7; cf. Brown 2001; Knappett and Malafouris 2008; Knappett 2011, 149–90; Hodder 2018.
6   See Whitley 2013; 2015.
7   One only needs to cite here the bitter, and on-going debate on the importance of the individual (by which 
traditional archaeologists mostly refer to the artist) as opposed to other factors – human or non-human, 
historical, social, cultural – affecting the creation, diffusion and reception of ‘art’ in antiquity. See, briefly, 
Bruneau 1975; Elsner 1990; Beard 1991; Whitley 1997; and so on, among the ‘challengers’ of the established 
views on classical art and contemporary approaches to it, as opposed to Morris 1993; Oakley 1998; 2009; and so 
on, arguing for the defense of the traditional methodology.
8   Shanks 2007 (after Bloor 1976).
9   Cf. Hodder and Lucas 2017.
10   On this passage, see chiefly Müller 1975; and cf. Zeitlin 1993, 147–54. For a recent survey of the discussion, 
see Gunther 2018, 179–82.
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[...] Look! come see, the son of Zeus is killing the Lernean Hydra with a golden 
sickle; my dear, look at it!
I see it. And another near him, who is raising a fiery torch [...]
I am glancing around everywhere. See the battle of the giants, on the stone 
walls.
I am looking at it, my friends.
Do you see the one brandishing her gorgon shield against Enceladus?
I see Pallas, my own goddess. [...]
(transl. Robert Potter; emphases added)    
What this text does is to describe a complete strategy of the gaze, at least in the way 
understood by Athenian audiences in the 5th c. BC. The technologies of looking revealed in this 
passage may surprise the modern reader or spectator: some of us may have been expecting 
a more historically sound description of what is now lost – temple pediments and friezes, free-
standing statues or stelae, monumental wall-paintings and mosaics. Our art-historians may 
have wished for a more accomplished account of the details we sadly miss: who made those 
images, and how were they precisely executed? On the contrary, the text lacks any interest in 
connoisseurship: no specialist terminology, description or analysis is present; we hear of no 
‘statues’, ‘reliefs’, ‘pediments’, ‘metopes’, and the like. We are told nothing about the nature 
of the sights these women behold: are they free-standing statues, architectural sculptures, 
tapestries, wall-paintings? Euripides seems solely interested in exhausting the possibilities his 
language affords him in describing the gaze in order to suggest a full-blown strategy of vision 
as a first-hand cultural experience, unmediated by art or craftsmanship. The queen’s maidens 
never ask themselves ‘who’ made the images surrounding them, ‘when’, or ‘why’. Poetic license 
notwithstanding, Euripides’ text places its human spectators in direct interaction with non-
human objects, carrying unmediated divine presence.11
Contrary to a Greek strategy of the gaze represented by Euripides, modern approaches 
are based on a completely different referential system. Let us ponder, as an example, on John 
Keats’ famous Ode on a Grecian Urn, written in 1819.12 Through a series of questions, forming 
a strategy altogether dissimilar to that of Euripides, Keats is organizing his own approach to 
the ancient artifact: his repetitive question-marks (‘What men or gods are these?’ [v. 1.8]; ‘What 
mad pursuit?’ [v. 1.9’]; ‘What wild ecstasy?’ [v. 1.10]) allow him to pose as a modern thinker, 
an art-historian and a connoisseur, perplexed by those enchanting, ‘Attic’ ‘marble men and 
maidens’ whose interpretation eludes him (vv. 5.1–2). The modern scholar’s aporia, imposed by 
the ancient monument’s silence (cf. vv. 4.9–10: ‘and not a soul to tell | Why thou art desolate 
can e’er return’), is somehow soothed by the recognition (or manufacture?) of the message 
hidden in the urn’s classical lines: ‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty’, a hyper-temporal reality which, 
as the poet claims, ‘is all | Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know’ (vv. 5.9–10).
The comparison of the two texts, random as it may seem, suggests that they exemplify two 
separate visual strategies: contrary to the spirituality we tend to attribute to what we describe 
as ‘classical art’, the Greek gaze seems to have appreciated those very same artifacts for their 
own materiality, as we have decided to call – inevitably risking to sound rather tautological 
– their self-value as inanimate things, which are however imbued with the ability to act as 
animate agents.13 Borrowed from anthropology and cultural studies, this somewhat dull term 
11   See the discussion of analogous texts in Gordon 1979, 6–7.
12   Keats 1996, 213–4; see Heffernan 1993, 107–15; Scott 1994; Kolocotroni 2012, 1–3.
13   On materiality, its definitions, and its applicability for an archaeological context see chiefly: Meskell 2005; 
ΑTHENS UNIVERSITY  REVIEW OF ARCHAEOLOGY 3  •  AURA  ·  76  ·
has proven quite useful for archaeologists in the last decade or so, even though its full potential 
remains largely underexplored. It does, however, mark a shift from an art-historical discourse 
focusing on ‘the’ producer and the technologies of production he (very rarely ‘she’) employs 
– to an emphasis on the user and the viewer. Thus, from emphasis on the meaning of the 
object ascribed during production we move to multiple, even contradictory meanings, created 
in hitherto undetected ways: engendered, embodied, mnemonic, sensorial.
The departure from an earlier anthropocentric agenda to a discussion of human and non-
human alike, and consequently to an understanding of material culture as the agent of social 
interaction through memory and sensual experience, rather than as merely the product of 
humans, allows us to move from the mere recording of material properties to understanding 
the affordance of these properties and the ways they enable or restraint interaction between 
humans and non-humans. In this paper, I will endeavor to rethink an early Greek ‘history of 
looking’14 based on recent approaches to agency and materiality in the classical world, and 
in archaeological discourse at large. My aim is twofold: on the one hand to explore the way 
Greeks interacted with things (especially images of things or, more to the point, things bearing 
images) outside a persistently anthropocentric and inherently humanist discourse; and on the 
other to imagine ways in which this rethinking of Greek art might affect the ways we receive 
classical culture today. In the following pages, therefore, I wish to examine ways in which early 
Greek art might have interacted with its viewer and the cultural concepts it helped create; my 
aim is not so much to ‘free’ our discipline from a limited, as well as limiting discourse which has 
brought us where we stand after a long century of meticulous art-historical reasoning, but to 
investigate whether new tools might help us pose some new questions – and help us resolve 
them to any extent. I have chosen early Greek art (c. 800–480 BC) mostly because I find this to be 
a rather underexplored field; also because, it may be argued, pre-classical art is fundamentally 
different from its post-480 BC successor, and not merely a hopeless attempt at achieving what 
would only ‘come naturally’ in the 5th century, that is a decisive turn towards verisimilitude in 
the visual arts. As Raymond Prier has argued in his study on the phenomenology of sight and 
appearance in Archaic Greece (a terminology reflecting precisely an art-historian’s idealistic 
bias towards the ‘High’ art of the ‘Classical’ Period), modern and postmodern scholars insist on 
reading pre-classical Greece through an anachronistic dichotomy between subject and object; 
in semiotic terms this would suggest the split between signifier and signified.15 As shown by 
Prier, this dichotomy does not apply to pre-classical Greece: contrary to the Platonic distinction 
between ideal forms and their material manifestations, seventh- and sixth-century aesthetics 
seem to maintain that abstract ideas become present ‘through the emotional and experiential 
commitment of the participants and an affective appearance from without’.16 According to this 
hypothesis, sights are indeed wonders to behold (thaumata idesthai) and images are not mere 
copies of an essential truth, but true and essential in themselves.17 
Representation was to be theorized by the Greeks as mimesis, a term that literally means 
Miller 2005; Hicks 2010; Knappett 2012; Olsen 2012; Hodder 2012; Van Dyke 2015.
14   Cf. Barthes 1980, 12.
15   Prier 1989.
16   Prier 1989, 71; cf. also the pioneering study by R.L. Gordon (1979), in which he discusses matters of religious 
art-production, departing from the standard art-historical paradigm.
17   In this, Prier anticipated the work of cultural historians such as W.J.T. Mitchell (2005) who, working 
independently of archaeology and anthropology, spoke of a "pictorial turn" in social sciences explaining how 
"made" things such as pictures are imbued with agency, and thus the ability to freely interact with humans.
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‘imitation [of reality]’, though not as plainly as that.18 Mimesis was understood by Greek 
philosophers of the Classical period as an elemental artistic faculty, representational rather 
than mimetic.19 What this representation entailed changed significantly from the Early to the 
Late Classical period and again with Roman critics. According to Jean-Pierre Vernant, mimesis as 
described by Plato and his pupils marked the momentous shift when ‘in Greek culture the turn 
is completed that leads from the ‘presentification’, the making present, of the invisible to the 
imitation of appearance’.20 This would mean that effigies of divinities in the Archaic period were 
not perceived as mere depictions, or ‘art’, but as manifestations, divine epiphanies, produced 
by the viewer’s own interaction with the realm of the divine. 
This kind of empowerment of inanimate objects with a quasi-human quality retained its 
strength, it seems, until much later than the naturalist turn in the early fifth century. In her 
study of the emergence of the physical body as a delimited ontology in Early Greek thought, 
Brooke Holmes describes the ‘person’ as a space of passage, a transformation process 
between daemonic forces, on the one hand, and symptoms and actions, on the other, what she 
defines, respectively, as the ‘felt’ and the ‘seen’ in Greek experience.21 Holmes argues that felt 
experience is elemental in ‘constituting the boundaries of a person in early Greek poetry’22 and 
Greek culture at large, and that a concrete notion of a body (individual rather than ‘dividual’) 
emerges in Greece only after the end of the Archaic period.23 Art’s inherent disposition for 
‘making things present’, therefore, thus turning what may only be felt to some thing that is, in 
addition, seen (as well as touched, smelled, tasted even)24 is crucial in this regard. Avoiding old, 
and somewhat anachronistic polarities between mind and soul, the divide – as well as dialectic 
relationship – between the felt and the seen enables us to study the intricacy of embodiment in 
the crucial passage from the Late Archaic to the Early Classical period. Early Greek technologies 
of representation, what we like to refer to as ‘styles’ in art history, are meant to deploy made 
likenesses as agents of their own materiality. This is why Euripides, writing in the last quarter 
of the fifth century, still feels at ease with the idea of a number of artistic likenesses at 
Delphi interacting with his female protagonists as real presences instead of mere images of 
absent beings. Rather than as an imperfect attempt at verisimilitude, therefore, Early Greek 
representation must be understood as a technology of imbuing inanimate objects with the 
power to affect the life of humans and help articulate their sense of cultural identity.
PRESENT MATTERS
Some time in the mid-seventh century BC, a woman named Nikandre dedicated an effigy of 
the goddess Artemis at her sanctuary on the island of Delos (Fig. 1).25 The statue, 1.75m tall, is 
now displayed at the National Museum in Athens as one of the first attempts at monumental 
sculpture – and it is perhaps no coincidence that its inventory number is, simply, 1.26 Although 
18   On the nature of mimesis in Classical thought, and the development of the concept, see chiefly Halliwell 
2002; Halliwell 2005; Elsner 1995, 21–8; 2007, 2–11; Squire 2009, 117–20; 231–2.
19   Cf. Halliwell 1987, 71.
20   Vernant 1991, 152–5; cf. Potolsky 2006, 15–7.
21   Holmes 2010.
22   Holmes 2010, 38.
23   Cf. Whitley 2013.
24   See Hamilakis 2013.
25   Boardman 1978 fig. 71; Despinis and Kaltsas 2014, 3–8.
26   Cf. Kaltsas 2007, 189, ‘one of the earliest life-size stone statues representative of the Daedalic style’. On the 
Daedalic style, more below.
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some recent finds have shown that the early history of Greek sculpture is more complicated 
than we once believed, and that such ‘first attempts’ were both more numerous and perhaps 
significantly earlier as well, this particular statue still remains a starting point for anyone 
wishing to survey the art of Greece in the 1st millennium BC. At any rate, back in 1975, when 
the study of Greek art seemed to have reached a point where the definitive narrative for it could 
be composed with relevant certainty, Martin Robertson, one of the most prominent ancient art 
historians of the later twentieth century, felt confident enough to dismiss Nikandre’s dedication 
as ‘rather clumsy, alike in design and execution’. He would, furthermore, ‘guess’ that its maker 
‘was a novice in marble, surely because he was among the first to practice this art in Greece, and 
not from any provinciality’.27 In the following paragraphs I will discuss Robertson’s approach 
to early Greek art, not because his remains the dominant paradigm; I am interested in his 
discourse because even if it has been refined, modified, developed, improved-upon and fine-
tuned by an ambitious generation of successors (Andrew Stewart, Nigel Spivey, Claude Rolley, 
Tonio Hölscher, Robin Osborne and Richard Neer to name but a few of the more influential 
ones), Robertson’s Problematik lies in the heart of any anthropocentric exploration of Greek art 
(or any other form of ‘art’ for that matter).
Robertson belonged to a long series of art historians who studied art (classical, post-
classical, pre-modern or modern) for its own sake. His agenda entailed the compilation of a 
continuous narrative of types, techniques, styles, and the craftsmen, often anonymous, who 
made it all happen; like many others in his discipline, he talks of masters and pupils, workshops 
and circles, all in anticipation of the much more accomplished Renaissance. Although he is well 
aware that ‘[h]istories of the arts, inevitably stamped more deeply even than other history by 
personal taste and the fashion of the time, can hardly satisfy many generations’,28 his synthesis 
strikes us as monumental, authoritative and extremely useful today as it must have looked 
when first published. In that it resembles a much earlier work of significantly wider scope, Ernst 
27   Robertson 1975, 37.
28   Robertson 1975, xi.
Fig. 1. Marble effigy of the Goddess Artemis; found on Delos, 
c. 650-640 BC. Athens, National Archaeological Museum 1.
Photo: Yiannis Koulelis (2018).
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Gombrich’s The Story of Art first published in 1950. Emulating Vasari (who in many ways imitated 
Pliny), Gombrich endeavored to ‘bring some intelligible order into the wealth of names, periods 
and styles’ that would form a global art history, from its ‘strange beginnings’ in prehistoric 
Africa, Asia, and pre-Colombian America to contemporary art and ‘the triumph of modernism’ 
– in the West, of course.29 The art-historical narrative emerging from this masterwork of epic 
dimensions and scholarly breadth is the single-minded quest for verisimilitude, a goal that 
was first achieved by the Greeks in the fifth century BC, then lost to be re-gained by western 
modernity. As such, Gombrich’s story of art is prone to the simplistic dialectics of ‘rise’ and 
‘fall’, the convenient biological metaphors of ‘birth’, ‘maturity’, and ‘death’, and the assuredness 
provided by determinism. Its teleological make enthrones its modern reader in the centre of a 
panoptic universe where the time is now and the truth comes only from the knowledgeable lips 
of an all-seeing art historian. Discussed, as it happens, as a stepping-stone to the Renaissance 
and the ‘conquest of reality’ as Gombrich put it, Greek art as a result is seen as little more than 
an incomplete first attempt.30
Assuming, on the other hand, that sixth-century artists craved for the naturalism achieved 
by their fifth-century grandsons (or, like Robertson does, accusing Nikandre’s maker for not 
being accomplished enough to count as equal to his successors in the craft fifty or sixty years 
later) is simply anachronistic;31 in a sense, it is like compiling an art history without history. What 
remains interesting in Gombrich’s work, however, is his own explanation for what in another 
work, first published in 1959, he calls ‘the Greek Revolution’, that is the eventual, as well as 
inevitable, discovery of naturalism by fifth-century artists, mostly sculptors.32 Classical mimesis, 
according to Gombrich, was achieved by the understanding of the viewer’s psychological need 
to find in art convincing imitations of reality as he (always a he) imagined it. Moreover, he 
maintained that the reason why the Greeks turned to naturalism was precisely the narrative 
qualities inherent in their art – or rather their own audience’s expectation of an art that would 
be able to sustain narrativity as provided in literature – the rather simple idea that literary 
descriptions of acts, situations or sentiments generate a series of mental images in the 
reader’s (or listener’s) brain that all are fundamentally naturalistic in character. Gombrich’s 
thesis remains, to a certain extent, valid today, one would wish however for a more articulate 
explanation of what went on before reality was ‘conquered’, back in the days of ‘primitivism’ 
and ‘strangeness’; as it happens, art-historical narratives seem unable to make sense of an art, 
or a time, they do not really admire.
Art-historical determinism seems embedded in Robertson’s History of Greek Art and has 
remained ever since, at least in the more traditional readings of classical art. To return to his 
account of Nikandre and her dedication, the dismissal of the thoroughly un-artistic, ‘almost 
plank-like block’, with the ‘roughly finished back’ goes hand-in-hand with his bald-faced 
indifference towards what is perhaps the statue’s more prominent feature – the long inscription 
it carries along its left thigh. Let us re-read it in full:33
Nikandre dedicated me to the far-shooter of arrows;
The excellent daughter of Deinodikes of Naxos,
Sister of Deinomenes, wife of Phraxos n[ow].
29   See the critique in Squire 2011, 33–62.
30   Elsner 2006, 69.
31   Cf. Squire 2011, 53–4.
32   Gombrich 1989, 99–125.
33   Cf. Whitley 2017, 85–6.
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While Robertson states that this epigraph contains a ‘rather surprising amount of 
genealogical information’ which ‘does not concern us otherwise, but the place-name does’ 
(from which he goes on to infer a Naxian origin for the statue and its maker), he does find the 
time to express his irritation about the fact that the long ‘verse [...] has perhaps squeezed out 
the name of the artist’.34 According to this strictly art-historical narrative, therefore, Nikandre’s 
dedication is worthy of our attention (as archaeologists, as classicists, as historians of ancient 
art) insofar as it can help us understand style – especially the style of the centuries to come – or 
discern the particulars of artistic creation in its day: who made it, where and when, and how is 
this artist related to the artistic circles of his day. Still, this discourse does very little to help us 
understand the ways seventh-century Greeks might have looked at the art surrounding them, 
the very art people like themselves had commissioned and created, not in an effort eventually 
to achieve verisimilitude, but in order to satisfy more present needs.
In contrast to standard art-historical narratives, deeply embedded in the humanist tradition, 
a more recent, patently materialist approach is now adopted by many in an effort to make sense 
of the archaeological record: whereas the former devoted all its energy within the confines 
of the atelier – thus privileging the artist as an exceptional individual who creates culture for 
others to use and profit from – the latter seems more taken by an artifact’s career after it leaves 
the workshop of its maker. Concepts such as an artifact’s ‘cultural biography’ or ‘social life’,35 
once solely concerning anthropologists dealing with what a classicist would only dismiss as 
‘primitive’, ‘peripheral’ or, quite frankly, ‘unsophisticated’ cultures, may be seen to emerge all the 
more often in classical archaeology, following a turn in the archaeology of the Greek prehistory 
that dates back in the 1990s. As already explained in the introduction of this paper, the new 
challenge is to make sense of artifacts in terms of their own materiality, that is the inherent 
ability of things to interact with humans. In many respects, classical archaeologists seem to be 
finding this quite a formidable task, mostly because of the textual character of their discipline: 
as the archaeology of Greece and Rome seems to be introduced to us through a wealth of texts, 
some of which are still seen as the paragons of western culture, for many of its students those 
texts provide all the information one needs to make sense of the classical world and the art it 
left behind. Furthermore, as it has been noted above, Greek art (often bypassing the fact that a 
great portion of it is known to us through its Roman translation) has been enlisted in an effort 
to explain European culture from the Renaissance on, a development that has left a discernible 
mark on classical studies.36 At the same time, constant evocation of newly popular terms such 
as ‘materiality’ (or its slightly older cousin, ‘agency’, on which more below) is seriously running 
the risk of becoming an end in itself, unless we are able to show how, and for what purpose, 
this new approach might help us make better sense of the classical past. What happened in 
art in the period we call ‘Early Classical’, the turn to naturalism through the deployment of 
mimesis as a new representational technology, was indeed ‘revolutionary’ as Ernst Gombrich 
has described it, though not necessarily for the reasons he would identify. In the following 
sections, I revisit some of the art of the preceding centuries, in an effort to reevaluate the ways 
it interacted with its audience. In this exercise, I will be using the texts these artifacts carry not 
34   Robertson 1975, 36; some scholars (e.g., among others, Karakasi 2001, 76–7) maintain that the lost part of 
the inscription did in fact contain the name of the sculptor; this assumption however is unsubstantiated, as can 
be demonstrated by the statue itself: the surface where the inscription was carved shows no extended damage, 
and accordingly the missing part of the inscription must have only contained one or two more letters and not 
an entire phrase such as ‘so-and-so made me’ or the like.
35   See Kopytoff 1986; Appadurai 1986.
36   Toner 2013.
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as ‘literary sources’ of historical significance – however grand or insignificant this may be taken 
to be – but as part-and-parcel of those artifacts’ cultural identity.
Fifty-odd years before Nikandre sailed to Delos in order to erect her dedication to Artemis, 
another worshipper, this time a man called Mantiklos, brought an offering to a sanctuary of 
Apollo in Thebes in the shape of a 30 cm tall figurine made of bronze representing the god 
himself (Fig. 2).37 The statuette, now having lost about one third of its original size, was an image 
of Apollo wearing nothing but a wide belt round his waist, a tall helmet (now lost), and holding 
his bow and arrows (now also lost, along with the statue’s right hand). Now looking rather 
dim, with the dark green patina we have come to expect from classical bronzes, originally the 
statuette would have carried a highly polished, bright gold-like hue. To the classically trained 
eye of a contemporary scholar it certainly looks crude, schematic, unaccomplished; its patent 
‘clumsiness’ can only tell us that any Greek revolutions will not be forthcoming for quite some 
time yet. Still, one cannot expect a viewer in the seventh century BC to have complained that 
such artifacts seemed too ‘schematic’ or more ‘frontal’ than they ought to be. The statuette 
commanded its own space, as well as the space around it through its make, its iconography, and 
the intentionality of its dedicant. The latter is declared through the inscription the figure carries 
splayed over the god’s thighs in what to our eyes seems a rather unsightly, and thoroughly un-
artistic manner (in modern terms we would be tempted to talk of vandalism):
Mantiklos offered me to the far-shooter with the silver bow
As a tithe; and you, o Phoibos, may you give him
Some pleasing reward.
The first striking feature the Nikandre and Mantiklos inscriptions are sharing is the fact that 
in both cases it is the statue, not its dedicant, who is poised to address the viewer.38 Thus, the 
statue, as a separate entity, intercedes in the exchange between the dedicant and the viewer in 
order to inform the latter, in the first person, about the former’s ties with the divinity the statue 
itself is representing. The texts inscribed onto the bodies of these divine creatures deploy an 
intricate network of inter-relations. The viewer is expected to appreciate the dedicant’s devotion 
37   The statuette is now in Boston; Boardman 1978 fig. 10.
38   Svenbro 1988; Depew 1997, 238–9.
Fig. 2. Bronze statuette of the God Apollo; from Thebes, 
early 7th c. BC. Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 3.9997.
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as well as social rank and means, which permit her or him to erect such an effigy in the first place: 
Mantiklos’ offering is described as dekate, that is 1/10 of his annual income, hence the viewer 
is invited to make the calculation in order to establish how much Mantiklos is actually worth. 
Similarly, the ‘surprising amount of genealogical information’ Nikandre’s dedication offers us 
helps construct her as a woman of status: her offering helps distinguish her as an ‘excellent’ 
woman and an important ‘Naxian’ at a time when Naxos controlled the sanctuary of Delos (and 
its coffers). Creating a social identity for its dedicant, the statue functions as a discriminatory 
tool, as it makes apparent who in that society is entitled to erect such dedications to Artemis 
and who is not. Given the emphasis placed on Nikandre’s career through family life so far, 
she may be safely assumed to have served as priestess to Artemis prior to her marriage. She 
would be then making this dedication in order to mark the end of her time at the sanctuary as 
she is ‘now marrying Phraxos’; becoming a priestess was a coveted distinction in Greek society 
of the Archaic period, reserved to those of social rank and considerable property.39 Ostensibly 
acting as mediators between their dedicants and the divinities they portray, these statues in 
fact mediate their dedicants’ social importance to their viewers, as it is them whom they are 
addressing. 
In this respect, such artifacts become works of writing as much as of sculpture. This however 
does not mean they can be ‘read’ as straightforward texts the way traditional, linguistically 
informed wisdom would have it. The epigrams inscribed on these statues demand of the viewer 
to perform the act of reading in full, which in those days would mean reading their verses out 
loud. Since silent reading does not appear to have been widely practiced in Greece before the 
mid-fifth century BC,40 reading such texts in the open air would require a performance or sorts, 
whereby the viewer becomes an actor impersonating the statue he is looking at. In the words 
of American sociologist Richard Sennett, ‘the Greek reader would have thought he heard the 
voices of real people speaking’.41 Vocal reading, therefore, acquires a performative trope which 
employs the viewer in order to enable the statue’s own agency. In this sense, the texts inscribed 
on these and similar dedications act through a material enframing of orality rather than their 
inherent textual qualities.  
‘Agency’ is of course yet another hotly discussed anthropological term which seems to have 
made itself necessary in order to understand the archaeological record, classical or not. In his 
seminal Art and Agency,42 published one year after his death, British anthropologist Alfred Gell 
argued that ‘what lies behind the seductive power of Art’ is neither its aesthetic deftness nor its 
ability to act as a highly sophisticated, and profoundly suggestive, language; he rather believed 
that, far from being a matter ‘of meaning and communication’, art ‘is instead about doing’.43 
This ‘doing’ was what Gell theorized as agency, in the belief that artifacts (including objets d’art) 
function as material entities which interact with their viewers and users by motivating their 
response. Gell’s theory seemed to work better with non-representational, non-visual art, its 
impact onto archaeology however was such that many classical archaeologists felt tempted to 
experiment with it in the study of classical art.44 Soon enough, scholars realized that the nature of 
39   Connelly 2007, 122–9.
40   Knox 1968; Svenbro 1988, 160–86; Johnson 2000. On the turn from loud to silent reading some time after 
480–450 BC, see Gavrilov 1997 and Burnyeat 1997.
41   Sennett 1994, 43.
42   Gell 1998.
43   Gell 1998, ix [Thomas, emphasis in the original]. On the concept of art in archaeology and anthropology, 
see Robb 2017 and cf. Skeates 2017.
44   As in Osborne and Tanner 2007; James Whitley, in particular (2006; 2007; 2012; 2013; 2015; 2017), has so far 
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agency affected the way we understand the materiality of things and that a correlation between 
the two concepts was necessary in order to proceed with a new theory of material culture.45 
Although some questioned the validity of this new theoretical trend and doubted its usefulness 
for the study of material culture,46 it seems clear that an anthropologically informed concept of 
materiality can improve our archaeological reasoning as well as allow us make better sense of 
past cultures where the human and nonhuman worlds were not treated as separable realms.47 
Understanding the materiality of the material world as ‘processual and in flux’,48 enables new 
interpretations of the ways ancient Greeks interacted with the things surrounding them; in 
what follows I will discuss the examples already mentioned, as well as some more, in an effort 
to establish the way they interact with their viewers and the mechanisms they deploy in order 
to control, through their material aspects, the flow of agency within early Greek society.
As already mentioned, when composing his anthropology of art Alfred Gell was mainly 
interested in ‘indigenous’, non-mimetic art. In a way he seemed to succumb to the old 
Eurocentric discrimination between the high ‘classical’ art of Greece and Rome which was 
(and still is) believed to have fertilized western culture at large, and the arts of peripheral, 
primitive, or exotic cultures that were only significant insofar as they attracted the gaze of a 
westerner connoisseur or collector (what Johannes Fabian had described as the allochronic bias 
in anthropology).49 However, even in an art carrying the burden of classicism, such as the art of 
ancient Greece, one can locate the animist beliefs inherent in the effigies of gods I described 
above: acting as ‘indexes of divine presence’, as Gell would term such images,50 the dedications 
by Mantiklos and Nikandre are not merely attempts to represent the non-representable but to 
objectify divine agency, empowering it for humanity.51 Animism substantiates the power of the 
god, his or her ability to ‘offer pleasing rewards’ as Mantiklos would hope, and thus the statue 
is employed in order to channel divine agency towards the dedicant, as well as the viewer. 
A literary example may offer a very clear illustration of this: in Herodotus’s Histories (1.30–1) 
we hear of the story of Kleobis and Biton, two brothers from the city of Argos who became 
famous for carrying their mother, a priestess of Hera, to the temple in time for a religious 
ceremony when the oxen designated for this task failed to turn up from the fields. The people 
of Argos, we are told, praised the athletic prowess of the two youths, who proved as strong 
as the beasts meant to drag their mother’s carriage, as well as their filial virtue. Proud of her 
sons’ feat, the priestess prayed to the goddess for a befitting reward for them and as a result 
they got to die that very evening as two very happy young men who had enjoyed the praise 
of their entire community. In the aftermath of this remarkable event, the story goes on, the 
people of Argos made effigies of the two men and dedicated them to Delphi, since they had 
led their short lives in such a distinguished manner.52 This story, and the text that relates it, 
are thick with references to the way material agency works in early Greece. Starting with the 
produced a significant amount of work discussing agency, materiality, and personhood in the context of early 
art. On art and its materiality in the Greek Bronze Age, see among others Herva 2004; Matic 2012.
45   Miller 2005, 11–5.
46   See Ingold 2007; cf. Tilley 2007; Knappett 2007; also 2012; Hodder and Lucas 2017.
47   Cf. Meskell 2005.
48   Tilley 2007, 17.
49   Fabian 1983, 143–4.
50   Gell 1998, 121–2.
51   Cf. Meskell 2005, 54.
52   The statues of two sixth-century kouroi discovered at Delphi (Boardman 1978 fig. 70) have been thought 
to be the effigies of Kleobis and Biton, even though other interpretations exist. It is interesting to find that 
Herodotus’s tale, a story within a story, imbues the two artifacts with its own materiality to our days.
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prayer of the priestess to the goddess, we hear that the woman (privileged by her position to 
enter the temple, whereas entrance to the general public was forbidden) ‘stood opposite’ the 
statue (agalma) in order to make her wish to the goddess: as Gell had noted, agency is effected 
through ocular exchange, through which the effigy distributes to the viewers the godly powers 
of the divinity it portrays.53 Since the story related by Herodotus must have taken place in the 
early sixth century BC at the latest, we may assume that the statue in question (possibly a 
wooden xoanon) looked a lot like the dedication by Nikandre – in our eyes, ‘clumsy’, ‘plank-like’, 
or ‘artless’. 
By classifying these idols as ‘art’, and quite incompetent art at that, we have ‘neutralized’ them, 
said Gell:54 the rendering of Nikandre’s dedication (what in standard art-historical terminology 
is referred to as Daedalic, from the mythological first Greek sculptor) is highly stylized, heavy 
with hieratic symbolisms, official attire and vibrant painted decoration that would surprise 
most modern viewers. Through the technologies we classify, often dismissively, as ‘Daedalic’, 
such as the so-called ‘triangular structure of the face’, the ‘tri-partite wig’ the statues seem to 
be carrying, or the angular, frontal and schematic fashioning of the body,55 the sculptors of 
the Archaic period did not so much endeavor to emulate nature and failed, but tried – quite 
successfully we ought to assume – to materialize the immaterial.56 These technologies work 
towards the production of what in Greek art can be understood as monumentality, an imposing 
three-dimensional presence affecting the viewer through the force of the materials it is made 
of.57 The agalma of Hera mentioned by Herodotus, as well as the Apollo dedicated by Mantiklos 
and Nikandre’s Artemis, function therefore as totems:58 a totem is a sacred object endowed 
with its own materiality, which enables communication between the world of the spirits and 
the world of humans; not human as such, totems are recognized by animistic religions across 
the globe as distributors of spiritual power on the one hand and human reverence on the 
other, thus forging a triangular relation between man, spirit and the mediator between the 
two. Accordingly, the ‘artworks’ discussed here are meant to realize the connection between 
the world of the humans and the world of the spirits – in other words, rather than acting as 
mere carriers of cultural meaning they also function as its creators.59 Entangled in a relational 
system of which they are at the same time objects and subjects, they are turned into agents of 
cultural interaction.60 This is verified by the Greek texts themselves, often stating that statues 
are (or seem to be) endowed with soul (empsycha) or breath (empnoa): one is reminded of 
Lucian’s Phalaris (1.11) and a number of couplets from the Anthologia Graeca (e.g. 9.736; 12.56; 
12.57). A Hellenistic inscription from Rhodes (c. 200 BC)61 mentions an empnoun bronze portrait 
of a man, aimed according to its epigram at reminding the passer-by of the just character of 
its sitter.62 On occasion, viewers/worshippers may have engaged in conversation with divine 
53   Gell 1998, 109–21; cf. Steiner 2001, 105, 115; also Pongratz-Leisten and Sonik 2015, esp. 24–33.
54   Gell 1998, 97.
55   See, e.g., Jenkins 1936; Ridgway 1977, 17–39.
56   Cf. Gordon 1979, 8–9; Morris 1992, 36–59; 238–56.
57   See Tilley 2004. In this respect, Ingold’s rather reactionary view that an anthropologically informed concept 
of materiality would be worthless for our understanding of material culture (Ingold 2007) manages nonetheless 
to draw our attention to the empirically perceived materialist aspects of artifacts which for a moment seemed 
to escape the attention of theorists discussing materiality as a rather abstract notion: see Ingold 2007, 14–5.
58   Gell 1998, 96–154; cf. Lévi-Strauss 1962.
59   Meskell 2005, 54–8; Knappett 2007, 22–3.
60   Thomas 1991; Hodder 2012.
61   Maiuri 1925, no. 19.
62   See, in general, Steiner 2001, 44–50; also cf. Gaifman 2006; Pongratz-Leisten and Sonik 2015, 38–51.
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effigies, as is suggested by the scene on an Athenian oenochoe, showing a man gesticulating 
towards a statue of Athena (Fig. 3).63
The animistic, totemic qualities of such agents turn them, in Gell’s terminology, into quasi-
prosthetic members of the personages they represent – human or divine.64 ‘I am the seal of 
Thersis; do not violate me!’ demands a sixth-century scarab from any perpetrator who might 
feel tempted to break its clay or wax impression upon a parchment, box, or cellar (Fig. 4).65 
The seal addresses its viewer in the first person, thus distributing the agency of its owner and 
in a sense invoking the sacredness of the act of sealing: for a seal-impression to be violated, 
either the sealing itself or the strings keeping it in place would have to be broken and this 
would undo the quasi-magical process of sealing the document/box /room in the first place. 
Sema, the word for seal used in this case, is the noun of the verb semaino, ‘to mark’. Sema thus 
distributes not just the agency of a person, but also the entire narrative regarding seals and 
sealing practices in Greek reality – from day-to-day bureaucracy to history and myth. The same 
term appears on what has often been dubbed as ‘the first Greek coin’: ‘I am the seal of Phanes’, 
reads the inscription over the blazon of a deer, sacred to Artemis and Ephesos, which is taken 
to confirm the authenticity of the coin, the integrity of the alloy used, and the value promised 
by its weight.66 Here, the object distributes – besides the agency of its issuer, whoever Phanes 
may have been – its inherent value, thus it seems to be promoting its sheer materiality. The 
entanglement of these artifacts – the statues, the seals, the coins – with a complex network 
of religious, political, or social beliefs and practices turns them into agents of precisely those 
beliefs and practices which they enforce onto the bodies and minds of their human viewers 
and users.
As is made clear by many literary accounts on art, mostly sculpture, written from the fifth 
century and until much later, mimesis and its technologies were primarily deployed in order to 
63   De Cesare 1997, no. 220; Oenbrink 1997, no. A13.
64   Gell 1998, 168–74.
65   Boardman 1968, 73.
66   Howgego 1995, 3–6.
Fig. 3. Athenian red-figure oenochoe showing man convers-
ing with statue of the Goddess Athena; from Sicily, c. 460 BC. 
New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art 08.258.25.
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conceptualize the divine and made its supernatural powers visually manifest.67 This exercise, 
however, enabled the representation of humans as well, and in ways that seemed to share 
something of the portrayal of the gods: the statues of Kleobis and Biton as erected at Delphi, 
according to Herodotus, would be seen to distribute their own agency (as ‘men who have 
excelled in their virtue’) to their viewers, as well as their agency of their collective dedicant, the 
people of Argos. The latter wish themselves to be known as a community that can produce 
members as worthy of praise as the two young men represented by the two statues. Through 
the erection of the two statues, the people of Argos constitute themselves as an exemplary 
Greek society worthy of the attention of Greece at large; more to the point, such a notional 
entity may be seen to (re)gain its material presence precisely at the moment a passer-by stops 
to look at the effigies of the two youths erected on the way to the temple at Delphi and leans 
forwards in order to read out loud the epigraph that accompanies them. As is made clear by 
the examples discussed here, statues in ancient Greece were ‘imbued with agency’ as standard 
phrasing would have it, but only within a framework of ocular exchange between the statue 
and the viewer. By looking at the statue (cf. Fig. 3), and through the performance of reading 
the epigraph it carries, often inscribed onto its very person, the viewer is able to release the 
agency such inanimate objects are emanating through the psychodynamic process the later 
Greeks came to theorize as mimesis. Agency is therefore a relational manifestation, ‘a process 
of becoming’ rather than a state of being – or having been made;68 hence these stories do 
not seem to pay too much attention to craftsmen and their skills, nor does the inscription on 
Nikandre’s dedication try to ‘squeeze in’ the name of its own carver. It is the act of looking, and 
the act of reading, that empower the materiality of the inanimate objects they are addressing, 
and it is the temporality of such actions, the here and now of looking at them that enables their 
social significance. (In the case of the Mantiklos Apollo, I would have guessed that the act of 
handling the statue, even merely for the purpose of rendering its inscription more readable, 
was also part of its day-to-day interaction with humans.)
This kind of human-thing interaction would be further enabled by random effects created 
by circumstance: light reflected on a statue’s glistening surface through windows and skylights, 
for example, or a gleaming torch, not to mention the fragrances emanating from the temple’s 
incense burners, would enhance the viewer’s sense that he or she is in the presence of a god.69 
Such accidental encounters would transform inert matter into a vibrant, living thing, which 
would initiate a spontaneous interaction with its human viewers, pretty much in the way we 
67   Squire 2011, 167–81.
68   Knappett 2007, 20.
69   Cf. Steiner 2001, 101–2; Corso 1999, 101.
Fig. 4. Drawing of an agate scarab seal with inscription; 
from Aegina, 6th c. BC. Unknown collection.
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would now treat an interruption from a flickering i-pad screen or a buzzing cellphone. One is 
reminded of Dodona’s prophetic sounds, triggered by the sonorous, albeit accidental, reaction 
of the oracle’s bronze cauldrons to the blowing wind or other stimuli, random or staged.70 
For many ancient authorities, including some Early Christian adversaries of paganism, the 
priestesses of the oracle interpreted the cauldrons’ sounds the same way they were able, 
according to other sources, to decipher the rustling of the sacred oak’s leaves when motivated 
by a sudden breeze. Socrates in Plato’s Phaedrus (275b–e) famously rejects this ‘unwise’ 
conviction: signs are just ‘reminders’, he says, of the things they are referring to, and in that, 
he adds, writing is just like painting – its creations appear lifelike even though they remain 
‘solemnly silent’. Plato is once again here using Socrates as his mouthpiece in order to voice an 
ostensibly ‘rationalist’ approach to the visual; his elitist iconoclasm, however, has been shown 
to have been irrelevant: as Michael Squire remarks, his ‘philosophical line in one sense had little 
impact on the sorts of ritual viewing that underpinned ancient cultic practice’, as Plato ‘neither 
dominated nor controlled the agenda’.71 It is the epiphany of things felt – irrational, accidental, 
or contrived as it may appear to us today – that turns what we tend to approach as a visual 
encounter into a fully sensorial ocular exchange.  
The emphasis on the moment of looking is accentuated by the inscriptions accompanying 
the statues, such as those of Nikandre and Mantiklos, addressing the viewer in the first person, 
or a similar epigraph from a sixth-century burial kouros asking the passer-by to stop and look 
at the statue while pondering on the fate of the man buried beneath it.72 The action implied by 
the noun used in this case – sema, the same as in the case of the seal and the coin mentioned 
above – represents an entire cultural scheme (the belief that a person’s grave ought to be 
visibly marked, monumentalized even), which imbues the artifact with the agency released by 
the act itself: ‘stand by the sema of Kroisos and weep for him’ instructs the statue the passer-by; 
‘[I am] the sema of Phrasikleia’ introduces itself another.73 The latter goes on to identify itself 
as a kore (statue of a maiden), who is destined to remain a kore, since the girl it stands for 
died before reaching marriageable age. Our humanist tradition would have great difficulty 
explaining the active role of inanimate objects in their interaction with humans;74 such speech 
acts may be explained only once we recognize the role of those ‘idols’ as agents of what actions 
this precise speech act is communicating.
It is therefore quite clear that the act of reading regulates the agency flow and resets the 
process that imbues those artifacts with their social significance.75 In the following section 
I will study a different category of Early Greek artifacts in order to investigate the ways in 
which inscriptions help empower their materiality through their visual as well as performative 
qualities.
TEXTUAL VISUALITIES
One generation or so before Mantiklos commissioned his dedication to Apollo, another 
man, residing at far-off Pithekoussai on the island of Ischia, took a penknife to scratch 
70   See Johnston 2008, 65–8.
71   Squire 2009, 118.
72   Boardman 1978, fig. 107.
73   Svenbro 1988, 26–43.
74   Cf. Svenbro 1988, 29–32.
75   Whitley 2017.
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three lines, in dactylic hexameter nonetheless, on a rather humble drinking cup:76 
I am Nestor’s cup, good to drink from.
Whoever drinks from this cup
straightaway emptying [its contents], the desire of beautiful-wreathed Aphro-
dite will seize.
Nestor is most likely the legendary king of Pylos, and his cup the fabulous depas described 
by Homer in the Iliad (11, 632–7).77 The unassuming kotyle from Ischia looks nothing like the 
‘splendid cup’ we find in the Homeric text; the ditty is demonstrably a joke between men in a 
state of inebriation. In this example, however, we find a pot imbued with the same totemic 
powers we came across in the case of the dedications of Mantiklos and Nikandre, as well 
as (and perhaps more crucially) with the seal of Thersis. Pots are, it seems, systematically 
inscribed in late-eighth/early seventh century Greece and often within the same convivial 
context:78 a fragmentary cup from Methone in Northern Greece identifies itself as the property 
of Hakesandros, warning (those who might steal it?) that they will lose their eyes (Fig. 5);79 
likewise, an early-seventh century aryballos from Cumae identifies itself as a lekythos belonging 
to Tataie (a woman), adding ‘whoever steals me will be struck blind’;80 several more pots are in 
the habit of identifying themselves as the property of a human: Qoraks;81 Tharios;82 …]oem[…;83 
and so on. And although the scarab of Thersis is the most elaborate example of an Archaic 
inscribed seal known to-date, other, less detailed ones, exist: ‘I am [the seal] of Ermotimos’ reads 
a chalcedony scaraboid from Dimitsana in Arcadia,84 while others simply name their owner in 
the nominative: Stesikrates;85 Aristoteiches,86 and so on. As it has already been noted,87 such 
inscribed pots, or other objects such as seals, enable a spiritual/human/thing entanglement, 
channeling (in fact generating) divine agency onto their human beholders, carriers, and users.
There are two points about this triangular interaction that have so far been underrepresented, 
I find. First, the intrinsically performative character of this interaction: the seal, for example, 
‘works’ only as so far as it is being used, time and again, inscribing on the body both of its 
own user as well as of those using or looking at the objects sealed with it, its divine powers 
– precisely because the act of sealing carries more weight that the seal itself.88 In the case of 
Nestor’s cup, its divine powers are explicitly deployed by the act of drinking-up, a task that only 
a half-drunk man can appreciate in full. Playful or ironic as such inscriptions may seem, they 
nevertheless establish a social space-time continuum where things are turned into objects in 
76   See, among others, Buchner and Ridgway 1993, 219 nos 168–9; Jeffery 1990, 239 no. 1; Powell 1991, 163–6; 
Whitley 2017, 76–82.
77   The reading ‘Nestoros e[m]i…’ in the graffito’s first line is preferable, I find, to the much less possible 
‘Nestoros e[n to]i…’ (‘Nestor had a cup…’), accepted by Manganaro 1995 and others; on the controversy, and a 
different, albeit rather farfetched, reading to the one proposed here, see Chaniotis 2011, 196–8. 
78   See Osborne and Pappas 2007. Cf., though, Rudolph Wachter’s strictly philological, and rather restrictive 
approach to the matter of such "speaking objects" in Early Greece (2010).
79   Besios et al. 2012, 339–43; cf. Pappas 2017.
80   Jeffery 1990, 238, 240 no. 1; Powell 1991, 166–7; Whitley 2017, 82–4.
81   Jeffery 1990, 356 no. 1.
82   Jeffery 1990, 76 no. 4.
83   Besios et al. 2012, 350–1 no. 7.
84   Boardman 1968, no. 516.
85   Boardman 1968, no. 561.
86   Boardman 1968, no. 427.
87   Cf. Whitley 2017 based on Hodder 2012.
88   Plantzos 1999, 22.
ΑTHENS UNIVERSITY  REVIEW OF ARCHAEOLOGY 3  •  AURA         ·  89  ·
order to interact with humans.89 As the human in the presence of a non-human entity imbued 
with divine agency is trying to make out the scribbly letters it carries, in order to enunciate 
its meaning, he or she is releasing whatever powers the object is supposed to contain for the 
benefit of him/herself and others.
Second, such oral performances are inherently pictorial in nature, in that they enable quasi-
visual encounters;90 incidentally, it seems quite ironic that artifacts like Tataie’s perfume bottle 
or perhaps Hakesandros’s cup would threaten their perpetrator with loss of vision! The lines 
sprawled along the hip of a marble Artemis or across the thighs of a bronze Apollo affect 
the statues’ visual impact – to the extent that modern viewers might feel they spoil their 
aesthetic integrity. The verse on Nestor’s cup, on the other hand, may also be seen to affect its 
appearance, at the same time however creating a mental image of a cup altogether dissimilar 
to the one at hand: the ‘magnificent work […] studded with gold’, with its ‘four handles […] 
around each one of which a pair of golden doves was feeding’ (Iliad 11, 632–5). Are we to 
suppose that the well-versed symposiast handling the humble kotyle at Pithekoussai imagined 
it being turned, even as a joke, into a golden depas or himself drinking from Nestor’s cup 
‘studded with gold’? Literary descriptions, it was pointed out above, generate mental images 
in our heads, reproducing what we know or what we can imagine. If a drinker could imagine 
his cup being turned into a golden depas and the reader of a letter could recall the face of the 
person who wrote and sealed it upon reading a name stamped on a piece of raw clay, then 
pilgrims to a Greek sanctuary were very likely expected to imagine the man or woman who 
dedicated the statue in front of them while performing the act of the dedication itself. In many 
cases, as with the examples of Kleobis and Biton or the innumerable burial kouroi and korai 
commemorating a departed boy or girl (cf. the examples of Kroisos and Phrasikleia mentioned 
above), the visual agency of the statue would create a pictorial aid so that the passer-by could 
imagine the long-gone individuals in their prime.  
The performative nature of the act of writing onto an artifact invariably produced by 
someone else, very often taking place long after the object’s making, helps us chart the nature 
of non-human agency itself.91 From within the western humanist tradition, the idea that 
89   Gell 1998, 62.
90   See Pappas 2017.
91   As Jesper Svenbro was arguing in 1988 (30), ‘it is only thanks to writing that [assertions made by artifacts] 
have been conceived and have come into being’. Although Svenbro, wishing to promote an anthropocentric 
reading of early Greek images bearing inscriptions, concluded that ‘this does not mean to say that [artifacts 
Fig. 5. Fragmentary skyphos with inscription; found in Methone 
(Northern Greece), late 8th/early 7th c. BC.
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inanimate things can affect the life and thoughts of humans seems preposterous. Yet, we all 
feel comfortable with the notion that humans can nurture feelings about things. Gell’s scheme 
was revolutionary in that it opened art history’s apparatus to concepts more appropriate for the 
study of such things-turned-objects as described above. From the discussion of various forms 
of non-human agency it is clear that although it is humans who imbue things with agency, 
once a thing has been turned into an agent, there is no turning back: as an object, it is now 
inseparable from its newly-found agency.92 It is within this relational system described above 
that things become significant in themselves and to the extent human actors have agreed to 
surrender portions of their own agency to them.
Certain directions in post-humanist thinking have further developed this idea of a society 
constituted not exclusively – not primarily even – by humans. Bruno Latour’s work from the 
middle 1990s is a case in point: attempting to understand ways in which materials influence the 
life and thinking of people, irrespective of human agency, he has professed to ‘reassemble the 
social’, that is reincluding non-human objects, which are ‘nowhere to be said and everywhere 
to be felt’,93 in social interaction. According to this line of reasoning, non-human ontologies are 
seen as active agents within the social networks and not mere bearers of social structures and 
meanings. Society is literally (and not metaphorically) built ‘of gods, machines, sciences, arts 
and styles’, Latour claimed.94 
Having said that, who is this kind of agency attributed by? Dedications customarily name a 
dedicant, though other inscribed artifacts, such as the pots and seals discussed in this section, 
may be less forthcoming in this regard: where does the agency of Thersis’ seal or Nestor’s 
cup come from? The owner of the seal (even when unnamed) is naturally the agent of the act 
of sealing itself, but not the agent instilling the inanimate object (as well as – crucially – its 
imprint) with the quasi-divine powers it has come to possess. These have to come from the far 
more intricate web of entanglements between humans, things, and the ideas invested in the 
latter by the former; the owner of the seal thus becomes a co-agent. A clay seal-impression is 
powerless in a world that does not respect privacy or has no concept of the right to property. 
Likewise, the little poem on Nestor’s cup would be meaningless to anyone not familiar with the 
Homeric text – and indeed in such a detail so as to get the reference to the king of Pylos and 
his goblet hidden within a subplot of what was to become the Iliad. The two inscriptions, like 
those on numerous other such objects, imply a collective ‘we’, a shared sense of agency and 
empowerment, for whom the relational system of ideas and values expressed in the artifacts at 
hand makes perfect sense. It is this collective subject – a subject distributed in itself – that helps 
distribute the agency of the things in question, an agency for which this collective subject acts 
as both the attributor and the receiver. Even when immediate agents are named (Mantiklos, 
Nikandre, the people of Argos and so on), we have yet to imagine a collective subject enabling 
the agency of those actors through the powers invested in it by the relational system of human 
and non-human interactions, factual or ideological, we have come to understand as ‘the social’ 
at large. Then, we need to allow for those ‘gods, machines, sciences, arts and styles’ Latour 
counted as parts of the social and their roles as active agents.
In the cases where dedicatory inscriptions are not phrased in the first person (cf. the semata 
of Kroisos and Phrasikleia discussed above), when that is the dedication is not ‘heard’ to address 
carrying inscriptions] are their own authors’, it is quite clear that their users and viewers treated such artifacts 
as material agents, capable of interfering with their own sphere of consciousness.
92   Cf. Knappett 2011, 172–4.
93   Latour 2005, 62–86.
94   Latour 1993, 54; cf. Knappett 2008.
ΑTHENS UNIVERSITY  REVIEW OF ARCHAEOLOGY 3  •  AURA         ·  91  ·
the viewer in person as is the case with the statues offered by Mantiklos, Nikandre, and so on, it 
is the agency of this collective ‘we’ that comes into play: the so-called ‘calf-bearer’, a dedication 
from the Athenian Acropolis showing a man carrying a calf as a sacrifice to the goddess Athena, 
is accompanied by a retrograde inscription informing the viewer that ‘Rombos dedicated 
[this], the son of Palas’ (Fig. 6).95 Although the pronoun implied here might be ‘me’ (that is 
the statue) rather than ‘it’, it is safer to assume that such inscriptions are meant to deploy a 
collective agency of reading and seeing for the benefit of the viewer. The man portrayed is 
not the dedicant himself, but a third entity, an idol symbolizing the dedicator’s piety (as well 
as exceptional social standing). The technologies employed – frontal pose; austere carving; an 
eerily smiling face; inset eyes so as to enhance the statue’s gaze; meticulously applied color 
decoration – are meant to communicate the statue’s meaning through the distribution of its 
dedicant’s agency.
A slightly later dedication from the same sanctuary, the so-called ‘Antenor kore’, shows a 
robustly built young woman carrying an offering (now lost) to the goddess.96 The accompanying 
inscription names its dedicator as Nearchos, identifies the statue as a tithe (aparche) for Athena, 
and names Antenor, son of Eumares, as its sculptor. The gender discrepancy between the 
dedicator and the statue itself confirms that such dedications were meant to define separate 
entities and not representations, however symbolic, of an individual. For some uses, as in 
95   Trianti 1998, 167; 170–1.
96   Trianti 1998, 94; 118–9; cf. Whitley 2007, 187–90; Whitley 2012, 584–5.
Fig. 6. Marble statue of a man bringing a calf to sacrifice; found on
the Acropolis in Athens, c. 570-560 BC. Athens, Acropolis Museum 624.
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burial customs, gender and age had to agree with those of the deceased, whereas elsewhere, 
as in sanctuaries, these appear to have been site-specific. With the Antenor kore, once again, 
the statue’s iconography and style are used to deploy the agency of its dedicator – and in this 
case its maker as well. Incidentally, this is a time when sculptors tend to advertise their skills 
through their work,97 pretty much the same way as dedicators advertised their social standing 
through displays, often extravagant, of their wealth disguised as religiousness and virtue.
Concluding this section, it seems evident that inscriptions on things – dedications or 
appliances – in Early Greece exploited their own materiality in order to effect the passage from 
what was felt to what could be seen; in doing so, they were meant to distribute the agency – 
collective or individual – of their owners, viewers, users or (less often) makers, thus constructing, 
as well as negotiating, social notions of selfhood. The last section of this paper will investigate 
how ‘art’ enables flows of social agency in Early Greece through its interaction with current 
ideas of what constitutes a ‘self’ or indeed a ‘person’ in the seventh and sixth centuries BC.
FLOWS OF AGENCY, CONSTRUCTIONS OF PERSONHOOD
In the scheme proposed by Alfred Gell,98 personhood is distributed through inanimate objects 
carrying a human subject’s agency. Gell’s persons are of course social, not biological ontologies; 
as such, they can be neither spatially nor temporarily contained. Human agents are themselves 
objectified, dehumanized so to speak to the bare essentials of their own cultural biographies. As 
social persons, ‘[they] are present, not just in [their] singular bodies, but in everything in [their] 
surroundings which bears witness to [their] existence, [their] attributes, and [their] agency’.99 
Material agencies interfere with human fields of vision in order to re-center social dynamics and 
control cultural flows. Following Bruno Snell,100 James Whitley has argued that, based on their 
entanglement with objects and stories, Homeric heroes in particular, come to us as ‘unstable 
assemblages of parts, neither properly responsible nor properly "persons" at all’;101 that is, they 
come to us, narrated and narrativized as dividual ontologies, fluid and multi-semantic. As my 
discussion here has shown, early Greek art – through its technologies of stylistic renderings, 
textual framing through the performatics of inscription, and narrativization through myth – 
deploys such dividual ‘persons’, mythical or mythologized, as indices of cultural meaning.
Let us revisit some of the examples already discussed in order to investigate ways in which 
they construct their subject’s personhood by means of generating and controlling agency flows. 
The dedication by Nikandre seems crucial in this respect: the statue, an effigy of the goddess 
Artemis, functions, in Gell’s terminology,102 as an index, a ‘material entity’, that is, designed 
to motivate ‘abductive references’ and ‘cognitive interpretations’ derived from the complex 
system of social beliefs and practices within which the ‘work’ is conceived, produced, and 
used. Nikandre, the agent apparent in this example, commissions an anonymous craftsman 
to produce the work in order to inform the public at large of her devotion (as well as family 
situation and social standing). Thus (Fig. 7):
Nikandre ► Artist ► Statue ► Viewer
97   Cf. Boardman 1978, 74–5.
98   Gell 1998, 21; 98–154.
99   Gell 1998, 103.
100   Snell 1953, 1–22; 1975: 13–29.
101   Whitley 2013, 397.
102   Gell 1998, 27.
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As an index of cultural values and social practices, however, the statue is imbued with agency 
by means of the goddess it portrays (whose divine powers it distributes) and the inscription it 
carries, the performative qualities of which distribute the agency not just of Nikandre, but also 




Deinomenes   ► Nikandre ► Artist ► Statue ► Viewer
Phraxos
Artemis serves here as the Prototype, ‘represented in the index often by virtue of visual 
resemblance, but not necessarily’; at the same time, however, the goddess, a social construct in 
itself, appears in this scheme both as an Agent, to whom ‘causal responsibility for the existence 
and characteristics of the index’ is ascribed, as well as a Recipient, considered to ‘exert agency’ 
via the index. Nikandre is distributed as a socially constructed personhood (‘excellent daughter’ 
and so on), herself implemented as an index motivating abductive inferences to her family’s 
standing, as well as the nexus of political and social economies that have established the island 
of Naxos as a leader in Archaic society (Fig. 9): 
Deinodikes }
[Artemis]






The brackets framing the end results of [Deinodikes] etc, [Naxos], and so on suggest the 
multi-facetedness of the end-dynamics, created by the multitude of viewers and the multi-
directionality of views generated. Although the schemes we use to suggest agency flows seem 
linear, they are in fact describing a non-linear, non-predictable dynamics. Along the same lines, 
Mantiklos is both the agent and the recipient of his own distribution, imagined by the reader 
of his dedicatory inscription as a very powerful person, as well as the recipient of the divine 
benevolence exerted by the statue, via Apollo (Fig. 10):
[Apollo]
▼
Mantiklos  ►    Artist      ►      Statue    ►    Viewer ►  [Mantiklos]
Similarly, the recipient of the agency exerted by the Kleobis and Biton dedication at Delphi is 
the city of Argos itself, acting also as the agent of the cultural values leading to the dedication 
in the first place. The quasi-mythologized, long-dead brothers, are evoked – in fact created – for 
the benefit of their viewers by their own effigies bearing witness to their existence so that the 
people of Argos can communicate their cultural values to a panhellenic audience. 
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The examples Ι discussed in this paper argue for a social construction of personhood in 
Early Greece; the ‘persons’ revealed by Early Greek art are relational, partible, as well as multi-
authored.103 Following French phenomenology and its emphasis on embodiment,104 a wave of 
more recent studies,105 have argued – albeit without reaching a universal consensus – for a 
more nuanced definition of personhood, permeable and fluid, though at the same time ‘firmly 
embedded in social relations, moral traditions and historical conditions’.106 Although these 
readings of the past – and especially its cultural productions such as art and the uses of art 
within the social nexus – might seem dehumanized and threatening,107 they nevertheless allow 
for a layered, historically sound, and anthropologically convincing reading of ‘art’ as an index 
of cognitive inferences and cultural values enmeshed in a world consisting of things both seen 
and unseen, real and imagined, natural and supernatural.108 Whereas, to return to this paper’s 
main case study, traditional art-historical discourse would limit itself in noticing that Nikandre 
‘takes pride’ in her family background as outlined in the inscription cut on her dedication,109 
the careful examination of the statue as an artifact imbued with its own materiality suggests 
that the flow of agency in this case, as with many others in Early Greece, was in fact reversed: it 
was Nikandre herself that was deployed as a social agent through a ritualized act of dedication 
meant to construct her, as well as the male members of her family, as ‘real’ persons entitled 
to affect society with their actions (or mere symbolic presence). Classical archaeology’s 
traditional, fundamentally anthropocentric paradigm compels us to imagine that 7th– and 
6th–c. korai display such a degree of ‘individuality’ so as to count as quasi-portraits of real girls, 
preferably the dedicators’ own daughters;110 as the discussion attempted here shows, however, 
the sheer materiality of these ‘abstract’, ‘stylized’, ‘schematic’ images constructs objectified, 
culturally-specific, non-personal versions of social personhood, to be distributed as generators 
of cultural meaning, through ritualized gestures and performative tropes deeply embedded in 
the social structure which they are used in order to maintain.
In Early Greece, personhood was constructed, distributed, and in effect ‘dividualized’ 
through the technologies of representation we tend to classify as ‘Daedalic’ or ‘Archaic’ styles 
(by which we mean ‘primitive’, ‘unaccomplished’ or plainly ‘clumsy’); that is a representational 
economy prior to the naturalist turn of the 490s BC – which in our eyes seems ‘revolutionary’ 
more or less because it looks like an eager anticipation of the Renaissance. The dividuality of 
ancient persons is evident even later, well into the Classical period, when a single man, such as 
Dexileos son of Lyssanias, could be commemorated, by name, on three different memorials in 
Athens, even if his remains could be laid only in one place.111 Dexileos, in this case, is distributed 
over space, offering the monumentalized materiality of his presence (as idealized imagery 
or merely through his name inscribed on marble) so that his state, kinfolk and immediate 
family may promote separate social and political agendas through three different monuments, 
103   Fowler 2004; see also Budja 2010.
104   Merleau-Ponty 1962.
105   Cf. Meskell 1996; Tarlow 1999; Thomas 2002; Voutsaki 2010. For a selection of recent studies with reference 
to Classical art, see the papers in Gaifman and Platt 2018, especially the Editors’ introduction.
106   Voutsaki 2010, 74.
107   Fowler 2004, 86.
108   Cf. Creese 2017 for a case study referring to seventeenth-century Iroquoian art, leading to the conclusion 
the art, in the article defined as both "form-taking" and "form-relating", "generates emergent realities, 
proliferates kinds and makes relations, including novel thoughts and selves" (p. 652).  
109   Despinis and Kaltsas 2014, 8 [G. Kokkorou-Alevra].
110   Cf. Karakasi 2001, 139–41.
111   On Dexileos and his stele, see Hurwit 2007.
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all singly commemorating one person’s passing from this life.112 Even though by the time of 
Dexileos’s death style in Greek art had changed dramatically, and effigies of gods and men 
now sought to imitate appearances – heavily idealized as they may have been – rather than 
simply, and poignantly, turn invisible entities into things present, we may still detect in these 
later works a deeply held belief on the ability of images to distribute personhood through 
their own materiality. Material agency helps us reevaluate cultural flows within Greek society 
to the extent that, on the one hand, we may form a better understanding of what ‘style’ is 
in Early Greece, and what Greek craftsmen – or indeed ‘artists’ – are really trying to achieve 
during the long 7th c. BC; and on the other hand, the notion of a ‘dividual’ personhood deployed 
within (and on the basis of) an intricate web of material and immaterial entanglements helps 
us reassess social dynamics at large.
Finally, the exploration of these case studies confirms that agency is not a faculty, but a 
process distributed across human/non-human networks.113 This process decenters human 
actors in favor of non-human ones, who, in turn, become quasi-humanized. The things 
discussed in this paper – statues, pots, seals – are always seen in the process of becoming 
their own agents: it is the ocular exchange with their viewers (not always subject to the latter’s 
initiative) that enables inert matter into becoming a cultural agent.
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